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Abstract
This paper analyzes the double dividend issues within the framework of overlapping generations models. We
characterize the necessary conditions for obtaining a double dividend, i.e. an improvement of environmental and
non-environmental welfare when the revenue from the pollution tax is recycled into a change in the labor tax rate.
We show that, depending on the initial capital stock and on the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, conditions
may be dened to simultaneously allow (i) the obtaining of a long term double dividend, (ii) the economy to move
closer to the modied golden rule and (iii) in the short term, an improvement in the welfare of the two present
generations.
JEL classication: D60 - D62 - E62 - H23 - Q28
Key words: Environmental tax - Overlapping generations model - Golden rule - Double
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1 Introduction
One of the advantages of the environmental tax is that it provides public revenue which
can be recycled. This is the reason why it is often preferred to subsidies or emission quo-
tas. Several authors such as Terkla [31], Parry [27], or Poterba [29] have argued that this
revenue recycling could reduce or even annihilate the gross cost of the implementation of
an environmental tax. As governments use the revenues from pollution taxes to decrease
other distortionary taxes, environmental taxes may lead to a double dividend, according
to Goulders denition, by both improving the environmental quality and achieving a less
distortionary tax system (Goulder [16]). Baumol and Oates [1], Pearce [28] and Oates
[26] have suggested that these e¢ ciency gains could be a powerful argument in favor of
environmental taxation. But a great number of theoretical and empirical works refute the
double dividend hypothesis (Bovenberg and de Mooij [5], [6] and [7], Bovenberg and van
der Ploeg [8], [9] and [11] or Goulder [17] and Bovenberg and Goulder [3]) and, on the
contrary, consider, that environmental taxes exacerbate, rather than alleviate, pre-existing
tax distortions.
As well as these potential e¢ ciency properties, environmental decisions have an im-
pact on the welfare of both current and future generations, since environmental quality
is a public good shared by di¤erent generations. These intergenerational issues on envi-
ronmental externalities1 or on taxation2 have been quite widely studied in the economic
literature. In an overlapping generations framework, John et al. [21] examine the e¤ect
of an environmental tax whose revenue nances a public pollution abatement activity.
Fisher and van Marrewijk [15], using an endogenous growth model with pollution, derive
the conditions under which a pollution tax does not slow economic growth. Bovenberg and
Heijdra [4] examine the e¤ects of a green tax on polluting capital when the tax revenue
is redistributed by lump-sum intergenerational transfers and nd that this tax benets
the younger generation but harms the older ones. Without studying the double dividend
1cf: Howarth and Norgaard [19], Marini and Scaramozzinno [25].
2cf: Kotliko¤ and Summers [24], Ihori T. [20].
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issue, all these papers conclude that environmental taxation implies such a welfare loss
for older generations that its implementation is not desirable: one of the generation which
would decide it would also bear the heaviest burden. The potential contradiction between
e¢ ciency and distributional concern has been already emphasized by some works in other
frameworks. While the double dividend hypothesis is rejected when the economy consists
of one productive sector, using only one productive factor (labor), and one representative
consumer (Bosello, Carraro and Galeotti [2]), when instead there are several productive
factors and/or several consumer groups, the double dividend can be obtained but at the
expense of distributive equity (Bovenberg and van der Ploeg [10], Proost and van Rege-
morter [30]).
Our analysis of the double dividend and welfare distribution issues takes place within a
framework of overlapping generations models, which seems more convenient for analyzing
such environmental problems. In the absence of altruism, the behavior of private agents
is responsible for an intergenerational environmental externality. The consumption activ-
ity of present generations causes emissions of pollutants which degrade the environmental
quality, harming the welfare of all future generations. The solution which is usually advo-
cated in order to internalize this kind of externality is the implementation of environmental
taxation (pigovian taxes). But such taxes imply non-environmental welfare losses for the
generations bearing them.
The conditions for a double dividend have not yet been explicitly derived in a dynamic
model which encompasses intergenerational externalities because balanced environmental
scal reforms have never been considered (in John and Pecchenino [22] or John et al.
[21] for example, the environmental reform increases the scal revenues). It is the reason
why generally in these papers the generation which has to implement the reform is the
one which mainly bears its costs. The main contribution of our paper is then to examine,
within an appropriate demographic framework, whether a revenue-neutral increase in the
pollution tax compensated for by a change in the labor tax can yield a long term double
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dividend, by (i) achieving the long term environmental objective and (ii) improving long
term non-environmental welfare.
The intertemporal double dividend could be dened as an improvement of the dis-
counted sum of non-environmental and environmental welfares of all generations. It takes
into account the welfare of the generations alive during the transition between initial and
nal steady-states. Such a social welfare criterion leads to the modied golden rule which
is preferred to the golden rule criterion because of both ethical and practical problems:
the rst generations would be sacriced to the future generations while only these will
fully benet from the environmental policy; moreover, decisions about future environmen-
tal improvements are to be made by present generations which support their economic
costs. The arguments given by Goulder and Stavins [18], for instance, in order to justify
discounting apply here to justify the use of the modied golden rule.
Our results for the long term double dividend are then linked to the general discount-
ing debate and contribute to the research of the conditions for an intertemporal double
dividend. Even if some generations are made worse o¤ along the transition path, any
increase in the social discount factor increases the weight of the welfare of the innite
number of generations alive in the nal steady-state equilibrium and (in case of a long
term double dividend) increases the occurrence probability of an intertemporal double
dividend. We focus then on the comparison of long term steady-state equilibria because a
necessary condition to obtain an intertemporal double dividend is that the generations on
the new steady-state equilibrium are made better o¤ with respect to both environmental
and non-environmental welfare. We show that, according to the discounted social welfare
criterion, a double dividend can occur.
Nevertheless, the issue of acceptability by the present generations induces us to study
the necessary conditions not only for environmental policy to be benecial in the long term
but also for not damaging the welfare of the generation which has to take the decision to
implement the policy.
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The model is presented in the second section of this paper. It relies on standard assump-
tions of the overlapping generations framework (Diamond [14]). The economy consists of
two periods lived individuals being a¤ected by the quality of the environment during their
whole lifetime. The government nances its spending with a labor tax and the pollution
tax. In the third section, we specify the budget-neutral reform. In the fourth section,
we characterize the necessary and su¢ cient conditions for the obtaining of long term div-
idends: an improvement respectively of steady-state non-environmental welfare and of
environmental welfare. In section 5, we study the necessary conditions for environmental
policy to be benecial in the long term and we examine the compatibility conditions of
both dividends: these necessary conditions depend on the capital intensity of the initial
steady-state equilibrium relative to the optimality conditions. Section 6 shows that the
scal change does not always harm the welfare of the present generations and that, under
some peculiar assumptions about agentspreferences, it is possible to obtain both a long
term double dividend and the respect of short term intergenerational equity.
2 The model
We assume that Nt individuals are born in period t. Population grows at constant rate
n therefore Nt = (1 + n) Nt 1. Each household supplies one unit of labor3 when she is
young and earns a wage wt; she divides her labor income between consumption and saving
st. In the second period the household consumes her saving and the interest she earns.
The welfare of an individual born at t is measured by the intertemporal separable utility
function:
U(cyt ; c
o
t+1; t; t+1) = u(c
y
t )   x(t) + 
 
v(cot+1)   z(t+1)

(1)
with cyt denoting the rst-period consumption of the agent born at t, c
o
t+1 her second-
period consumption and t+i the per capita stock of pollution at t + i (cf. infra). The
3Our long term view allows us to assume full employment. Moreover we focus on an e¢ ciency double
dividend (according to Goulder [16]) and not on an employment double dividend. In another paper, in a
similar framework but with involuntary unemployment, we study the existence conditions for an e¢ ciency
double dividend and the role of the employment dividend (Chiroleu-Assouline and Fodha [12]).
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intertemporal discount factor is  (with 0 <  < 1) and  is the weight of the pollution
externality in the welfare evaluation ( > 0). Assume that the four instantaneous compo-
nents of the utility function, u; v; ( x) and ( z) exhibit the usual properties: they are
increasing in their argument, strictly concave and satisfy the Inada conditions.
The real interest rate is rt+1. At period t, the pollution tax rate is  et . The pollution is
assumed to be due to consumption, with a the emission rate of pollutants. The households
budget constraints can be written as follows:
wt = (1 + a 
e
t ) c
y
t + st
(1 + a  et+1) c
o
t+1 = (1 + rt+1) st
(2)
The intertemporal budget constraint of the agent born at t is given by:
wt = p
y
t c
y
t + p
o
t+1 c
o
t+1 (3)
where pyt = (1 + a 
e
t ) is the rst period after-tax consumption price and p
o
t+1 =
1+a et+1
(1+rt+1)
the second period discounted one.
The households problem is to choose her consumption path to maximize her lifetime
utility (eq.1) subject to the intertemporal budget constraint (eq.3). The rst order condi-
tions yield:
@U
@cyt
@U
@cot+1
=
pyt
pot+1
(4)
This relation determines the optimal consumption and saving path of the representative
household, within the Diamond framework (Diamond [14]) with a homothetic utility func-
tion4: 8>>>><>>>>:
cyt = cy

wt; p
y
t ;
pyt
pot+1

cot+1 = co

wt; p
o
t+1;
pyt
pot+1

st = s

wt;
pyt
pot+1
 (5)
4With this assumption, saving depends on the ratio of the prices on the life cycle (
pyt
pot+1
) and linearly
on the wage rate wt. Thus, both consumptions depend also on their direct price, on
pyt
pot+1
(and then on
rt+1) and on wt.
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The production sector consists of many rms, each of them being characterized by the
same production function f which has constant returns to scale and satises the Inada
conditions. Output per capita yt is a function of capital per capita kt, i.e. yt = f(kt):
The maximization problem of the representative rm is (taking the output price as nu-
meraire):
Max
kt
Rt = f (kt)  wt (1 + wt )  (rt + ) kt
with Rt the current net revenue, wt the labor tax rate (
w
t is levied on rms and is not
an income tax levied on households), wt the real wage rate and  the depreciation rate of
capital.
Since markets are competitive, capital and labor earn their marginal products:8<: r (kt) = f
0(kt)  
w (kt; 
w
t ) =
f(kt) kt f 0(kt)
(1+wt )
(6)
We assume that government spending is entirely nanced by current taxes. The gov-
ernments budget constraint states that its purchases (gt per capita) must equal, at each
period t; its scal revenues generated by the pollution tax and the labor tax. The equilib-
rium of the per capita governments budget is:
a  et

cyt +
1
1 + n
cot

+ wt wt = gt (7)
The pollution ow is assumed to be due to the householdsconsumption (waste pro-
duction, for example), and the households welfare is a¤ected by the per capita stock
of pollution t+i during the rst and the second-period of her life, whose dynamics is
described by the following equation:
t+1 =
1  h
1 + n
t + a

cyt+1 +
1
1 + n
cot+1

(8)
where h is the constant rate of natural absorption of pollution (0 < h < 1) and a > 0 the
emission rate of pollutants. This specication encompasses both intra- and intergenera-
tional externalities. Our model addresses special cases of rival pollution, like air pollution
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or wastes (as in Marini and Scaramazzino [25]). It could be modied to take account of
global pollution: the externality would in this case depend on the total stock of pollution.
But, in this last case, the model would not admit any steady-state unless the population
rate of growth is nul5.
The equilibrium of the output good market can be written as follows:
yt = c
y
t +
1
1 + n
cot + (1 + n) kt+1   (1  ) kt + gt (9)
which yields, by substituting the zero-prot condition, the governments budget constraint
(eq.7) and the households budget constraints (eq.2) the following equation:
kt+1 =
1
1 + n
st (10)
which is similar to the equilibrium condition of the capital market, meaning that the cap-
ital stock in period t+ 1 is the amount saved by young individuals in period t.
Substituting the real wage and the interest rate resulting from prot maximization
(eq.6) into the optimal consumptions and saving of household yields their values at the
decentralized equilibrium:8>>>><>>>>:
cyt = cy
h
w (kt; 
w
t ) ; p
y
t (
e
t ) ;
pyt
pot+1
 
 et ; 
e
t+1; r (kt+1)
i
cot+1 = co
h
w (kt; 
w
t ) ; p
o
t+1
 
 et+1

;
pyt
pot+1
 
 et ; 
e
t+1; r (kt+1)
i
st = s
h
w (kt; 
w
t ) ;
pyt
pot+1
 
 et ; 
e
t+1; r (kt+1)
i (11)
The dynamics of the economy are obtained by using the equilibrium of the capital market
(eq.10):
(1 + n) kt+1 = s
h
w (kt; 
w
t ) ;
pyt
pot+1
 
 et ; 
e
t+1; r (kt+1)
i
This equation implicitly denes kt+1 as a function of kt: The steady-state equilibrium is
dened by kt+1 = kt = k^, with k^ satisfying the following equation of k:
(1 + n) k = s
h
w (k; w) ; p
y
po (r (k))
i
5Another interpretation of this model could be that of John et al. [21] who assume an externality
depending on the level of the stock of environmental resources but establish the technical conditions that
the utility function has to obey in order to allow the steady state of their economy to be dened as an
equilibrium where all per capita variables remain constant.
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With the homothetic utility function, the steady-state per capita capital stock is indepen-
dent6 of the pollution tax rate  e:8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
c^y = cy
h
w

k^; w

; r

k^

;  e
i
c^o = co
h
w

k^; w

; r

k^

;  e
i
s^ = s
h
w

k^; w

; r

k^
i
k^ = k (w)
(12)
At the steady-state equilibrium, the total stock of pollution is given by:
^ =
a
n+ h

(1 + n) cy
h
w

k^; w

; r

k^

;  e
i
+ co
h
w

k^; w

; r

k^

;  e
i
(13)
To ensure existence, unicity and stability of the steady-state equilibrium, we assume
that, in addition to the Inada conditions and the homotheticity assumption, the two
following conditions are met:
 nonvanishing labor share lim
k!0
(f 0k:k)=f(k) 2 [0; 1) (Konishi and Perera-Tallo [23]);
 s0r(w; r) > (1 + n)=f 00(k) which means that the degree of intertemporal substitution
between consumption when young and consumption when old () should not be too
small, so that the substitution e¤ect will not be dominated too much by the income
e¤ect due to changes in the rate of return7 (de la Croix and Michel [13]).
3 The specication of the scal reform
We assume an exogenous increase of the pollution tax rate, imposed by the government
in order to control pollution. The amount of government purchases is assumed ex post
invariant. This increase d e of the pollution tax rate causes a variation of the labor tax
rate dw. At the steady-state equilibrium, the governments budget constraint (eq.7) can
be written as follows:
g = w w

k^; w

+ a  e

cy
h
w

k^; w

; r

k^

;  e
i
+
co
1 + n
h
w

k^; w

; r

k^

;  e
i
6 At the steady state, the relative price between both periods of life is simply given by
py
po
= 1 + r:
7For example, in case of a CIES utility function with intertemporal substitution elasticity  and a CES
production function with substitution elasticity 1=(1 + ), this condition becomes:  > 1=(1 + ).
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The link between the variations of the pollution tax and of the labor tax is obtained
through the di¤erentiation of this constraint. Any balanced scal reform is characterized
by the following relationship between d e and dw:
dw =  d e
with  the balanced scal reform multiplier :
 =  a
c^y
 
1+Ecy=e
 
!
+
c^o
1+n
 
1+Eco=e
 
!

w^+w  

+ae
"

w^ 
 
c^y Ecy=w
+
+
c^o
1+n Eco=w
+
!#
+ae
"
	
r^
+
 
c^y Ecy=r
?
+
c^o
1+n Eco=r
+
!# (14)
where Ex=y denotes the elasticity of variable x relative to variable y.
Recall that, with a homothetic utility function, the e¤ect of the interest rate on the
consumption of the young generation depends on the value of the intertemporal substitu-
tion elasticity ( =   U
0
co
coU
00
co
) relative to unity. More precisely, we have
@s
@r
S 0 and then
@cy
@r
T 0 if and only if  S 18.
The e¤ects of the labor tax on the wage rate and on the interest rate are respectively
measured by the parameters  and 	:  = ww
 
Ew=w + Ew=k Ek=w

measures both the
direct and indirect e¤ects of w on the real wage rate: it is negative. Both e¤ects are
going the same way. As the per capita capital stock remains constant, the labor produc-
tivity, (1 + w)w^, is unchanged and the wage rate may increase in order to compensate
for a decrease of the labor tax (Ew=w < 0): this is the direct e¤ect. The second e¤ect
is an indirect one: a decrease of the labor tax rate enhances the per capita capital stock
(Ek=w < 0) and increases the marginal product of labor and consequently its rate of
return (Ew=k > 0). 	 = @r@k
@k
@w captures only the indirect e¤ect of 
w on the real interest
rate. In case of a decrease of the labor tax, the per capita capital stock rises ( @k@w < 0)
leading then to a decrease of the marginal product of capital and thus of its rate of return
( @r@k < 0).
8For a logarithmic utility function,  = 1; and then
@s
@r
=
@cy
@r
= 0.
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It might have been expected that a cut in labor tax would be in any case allowed for
by an increase in the pollution tax rate, but we will now show that it is not the case here:
on the one hand, the budget is assumed to be balanced ex post during each period, and
on the other hand, the variation of the per capita capital stock yields opposite e¤ects on
the wage rate and on the interest rate which are the main determinants of consumption
(eq.12).
Proposition 1 The sign of the balanced scal reform multiplier  is a priori undeter-
mined and depends on the initial tax rates and on the values of the various elasticities.
Proof. (i) The numerator measures the e¤ect of the change in pollution tax rate on its
revenue. There are both a value e¤ect (the tax revenue increases with the tax rate, for
unchanged consumption) and a scal base e¤ect (consumption decreases as the tax rate
increases, thus the scal base erodes) which work in opposite ways. As a result, this term
might be positive or negative9.
(ii) a ew^

c^y Ecy=w +
c^o
1 + n
Eco=w

< 0 is the e¤ect of the change of w (via the total
e¤ects on wages) on scal revenues of pollution tax. There is only a scal base e¤ect.
(iii) a e	r^

c^y Ecy=r +
c^o
1 + n
Eco=r

? 0 is the e¤ect of the change of w (via the total
e¤ects on the interest rate) on the scal revenues of pollution tax levied on both gen-
erations. There is only a scal base e¤ect, but the nal e¤ect stays undetermined and
depends on the value of the elasticity of the consumption of the younger individuals to
the interest rate. If this elasticity is positive or nil ( 6 1), this term is unambiguously
positive.
(iv) w^+ w  ? 0 is the e¤ect of the change of w on its scal revenue. There are both a
value e¤ect (the scal revenue increases with the tax rate, for an unchanged wage) and a
scal base e¤ect (the wage decreases as the tax rate increases, thus the scal base erodes).
As the signs of the numerator and of the rst and third terms of the denominator are
undetermined, the sign of the necessary change in the labor tax is also undetermined.
9 If there were two consumption goods, one clean and one dirty, the scal base e¤ect would depend on
the elasticity of substitution between the consumption goods. The higher this elasticity, the greater the
environmental improvement, but the lower the scal revenue to be recycled.
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One could think that the case where a rise in labor tax is required could not lead to a
double dividend situation but we will show later that conclusions are not so straightfor-
ward.
4 The welfare e¤ects of the scal reform
We examine here the welfare e¤ects of the scal change for a generation during its life-
cycle, once the nal steady-state equilibrium is reached. In this section, the welfare issue
is thus a long term one (short term issues are addressed in the sixth section).
One can measure the welfare e¤ects of small scal changes by the marginal excess
burden. This marginal excess burden corresponds to the additional income that needs to
be provided to the representative household to keep her utility at its initial level: this
is the compensatory income variation, denoted dRc. It stands for the excess welfare loss
of the consumers over and above the tax revenues collected by the government and can
be interpreted as the hidden costs of nancing public spending: a positive value for the
marginal excess burden indicates a loss in welfare after the scal reform.
Let us determine the compensatory income variation which, after the scal reform
(dw =  d e), would leave the level of life-cycle utility unchanged (dU = 0):
@u
@cy
dcy    @x
@
d + 
@v
@co
dco     @z
@
d = 0
We use the rst-order conditions of the representative households program (eq.4) and the
denition of the compensatory income variation dRc:
dw + dRc = c^
y dpy + py dcy + c^o dpo + po dco
this leads to:
py dcy + po dco   po 
@v=@co

1

@x
@
+
@z
@

d = 0
Like Bovenberg and de Moiij [5], one can distinguish an environmental component dRec
dRec = p
o 
@v=@co

1

@x
@ +
@z
@

d

and a non-environmental one dRnec (dR
ne
c =  dw +
11
c^y dpy + c^o dpo): The compensatory income variation is then:
dRc = dR
ne
c + dR
e
c
According to Goulders denition of a strong double dividend (Goulder [16]), we consider
that a double dividend will be obtained if and only if environmental welfare and non-
environmental welfare simultaneously improve. As the increase in environmental welfare
becomes higher, as well as the increase in consumption prices and the wage decrease
become lower, the resulting compensatory income variation will be smaller.
4.1 The environmental dividend: the rst dividend
The variation of environmental welfare depends both on its sensitivity to per capita pol-
lution and on the sensitivity of pollution to the consumption of the two generations10.
Di¤erentiating the expression for the steady-state per capita pollution stock (eq.13) yields:
n+ h
a
d = (1 + n) dcy
h
w

k^; w

; r

k^

;  e
i
+ dco
h
w

k^; w

; r

k^

;  e
i
where the consumption variations are given by the following expressions:
dci = ic d
e with ic =
@ci
@ e 
+
0@@ci
@w
+
  +
@ci
@r
?
	
+
1A  and i = (y; o) (15)
When  6 1, the scal policy has the same e¤ects on the consumption of the old and
of the young generations (
@ci
@r
> 0). If the increase in  e requires an increase in w, both
e¤ects of wage decreasing and of consumption cost increasing diminish the consumption c^i.
But the fall in capital stock k^ increases the interest rate and stimulates consumption: the
nal e¤ect is unknown. On the contrary, in case of a cut in labor tax ( < 0), consumption
will decrease only if the negative e¤ect of the pollution tax and of interest rate is greater
than the positive e¤ect allowed for by the wage augmentation ( < 0). But, when  > 1, if
the increase of pollution tax rate results in an increase in labor tax rate ( > 0) the e¤ect
concerning the consumption of the younger individuals is unambiguously negative (while
10An environmental dividend is characterized by a negative dRec which occurs if and only if per capita
pollution stock decreases.
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the e¤ect on the consumption of the older remains ambiguous), because of the decrease in
the wage rate and the rise in the rst period consumption price on the one hand, and on
the other hand, the rise of the interest rate which makes saving more attractive.
Finally, the variation of the per capita stock of pollution is obtained by:
n+ h
a
d = ((1 + n) yc + 
o
c) d
e (16)
Let us see the precise links between , yc and oc :
ic < 0 if and only if

@ci
@w
+
@ci
@r
	

 <   @c
i
@ e
with i = (y; o)
At each period of the households life, when the rise in the pollution tax rate can be
balanced through a reduction of the tax rate on labor, the nal e¤ect on consumption will
be negative if and only if the income e¤ect is lower than the price e¤ect, that is if the
consumption rise (due to the wage increase and eventually to the interest rate decrease) is
more than compensated for by the decrease due to price augmentation ; the rst dividend
will be all the more easy to obtain as
@cy
@r
> 0 i.e. as  6 1: But when  > 0; the
lower are the income e¤ects as compared to the price e¤ects and the more easily will the
rst dividend be obtained. In this case,  > 1 (i.e. yc < 0) increases the probability of
obtaining the rst dividend.
4.2 The existence conditions of a second dividend
In this framework, the second dividend is obtained when the non-environmental compen-
satory income variation is negative (dRnec < 0). The nal result will depend on the e¤ect of
the scal reform on the wage rate and on prices, but not on the allocation choice between
present and future consumption. Consequently, the intertemporal elasticity of substitu-
tion, ; which played the crucial role for the obtaining of the rst dividend, is pointless
here.
- Welfare e¤ect through the wage:
dw =  dw =   d e
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As  < 0, the e¤ect on the wage depends only on the sign of . If the pollution
tax rise is balanced by a decrease of the tax rate on labor, the wage will increase,
playing in favor of the double dividend hypothesis (the marginal excess burden would
be lower).
- Welfare e¤ects through price variations:8>><>>:
dpy =
@py
@ e
d e
dpo =

@po
@ e
+
@po
@r
	 

d e
,
8<: dp
y = a d e
dpo =
1
1 + r
(a  po 	 ) d e
The rst-period consumption price increases unambiguously but the second-period
price may diminish if  > 0 (the second-period price decreases when the interest
rate r rises). In the case of a decrease of the tax rate on labor ( < 0), both prices
increase, which leads to a rise in the marginal excess burden of the scal reform.
The nal e¤ect on non-environmental welfare is measured by the compensatory income
variation dRnec :
dRnec =  dw + c^y dpy + c^o dpo (17)
=

   + c^y a+ 1
1 + r
c^o (a  po 	 )

d e
Even in the more intuitive case of a decrease in the labor tax ( < 0) and of a
reduction of consumption during both periods (yc < 0 and oc < 0 or at least of global
consumption (1 + n) yc+oc < 0) which leads to an environmental dividend, the existence
of the double dividend depends on the relative magnitude of the e¤ects on the wage, on
the environmental welfare, on the scal base of the pollution tax and on the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution.
5 Double Dividends and the Golden Rule
In this section, we analyze the compatibility conditions between both long term dividends.
We show that, whatever the sign of the variation in the labor tax rate w implied by the
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environmental scal reform, the obtaining of a double dividend depends on the capital
intensity of the initial steady-state and on the intertemporal elasticity of substitution .
Rewriting dRnec (eq.17) while di¤erentiating the equilibrium households budget con-
straint (eq.3), leads to the following new denition of the non-environmental compensatory
income variation:
dRnec =  pydcy   podco (18)
It is worth noting here that the second dividend cannot occur if consumption falls during
both periods; symmetrically, the rst dividend will be excluded if consumption rise during
both periods. Finally, the only case of double dividend is the one where both consumptions
go in opposite ways. We will limit the study to this case.
Notice that, ceteris paribus, the crucial parameter for the obtaining of the double
dividend is the elasticity of consumption to the interest rate. This is indeed the only
e¤ect which can play in opposite ways on the consumption of the older and of the younger
generation, under homothetic preferences. This property clearly appears by using eq.(15),
rewritten in terms of elasticities:
yc
c^y
  
o
c
c^o
=
 
Ecy=r   Eco=r
+
!
Er=k Ek=w
w| {z }
+
 (19)
Combining eq.(16) and eq.(18) leads to the following necessary condition for both
dividends to be obtained together:
0 > yc +
1
1 + n
oc >
r   n
(1 + r) (1 + n)
oc (20)
This condition induces us to refer to the per capita capital stock dened by the golden
rule11 and to take into account the ine¢ ciency property of the overlapping generations
models, in a competitive framework12, which requires us to distinguish two cases: under-
accumulation and over-accumulation of capital. Nevertheless the social optimum for this
11The golden rule determines the per capita capital stock k^g which maximizes the steady-state con-
sumption. It is given by the equality between the net capital return f 0

k^g

   and the growth rate of
population n.
12The competitive equilibrium of an OLG model is in general not e¢ cient: it is characterized either by
over-accumulation k^ > k^g (or equivalently r^ < n) or under-accumulation k^ < k^g:
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economy is dened by the modied golden rule (as we consider that the social planner uses
a discounted welfare criterion), which yields the optimal level of capital k^, with  < 1 the
social discount factor13.
Proposition 2 When the initial competitive steady-state equilibrium is characterized by
under-accumulation (resp. over-accumulation), the necessary conditions for a double div-
idend are the following:  yc > 0oc < 0

resp.
 yc < 0oc > 0

Proof. See equation (20) :
By writing the equilibrium of the output good market (eq.9) at the steady-state equi-
librium, let us dene the link between the net output (sum of aggregate consumption and
exogenous public expenditures g) and the per capita capital stock k:
C (k) = cy(w(k); r(k)) +
co(w(k); r(k))
1 + n
+ g = f(k)  (n+ )k
This function is strictly concave and veries: C (0) = 0; C
00
() 6 0; lim
k!0
C
0
() = +1; lim
k!1
C
0
() =
 1; C 0 () > 0 if k 2
i
0; k^g
i
and C
0
() < 0 elsewhere14.
This writing allows us to easily deduce how the rst dividend can be obtained be-
cause the pollution stock decreases if and only if net output decreases: in case of under-
accumulation, the balanced environmental scal reform (g exogenous) has to decrease the
per capita capital stock k^ while it has to increase it in case of over-accumulation (see
Figure 1).
Proposition 3 When the initial steady-state competitive equilibrium is characterized by
k^ < k^ < k^g, the necessary conditions for obtaining a double dividend are (i)  > 0 and
(ii)  < 1; in this case, the environmental reform moves the economy closer to the modied
golden rule.
13The optimal level of capital k^ is lower than k^g because 

f 0(k^) + (1  )

= f 0(k^g)+ (1  ). There
is necessarily under-accumulation at k^.
14The golden rule capital stock k^g also maximizes net output in our case.
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C(k)
qkˆ gkˆ
g
k
π(k)
π( qkˆ )
Figure 1: Long term net output, pollution and rst dividend
Proof. (i) If k^ < k^ < k^g, the rst dividend needs to reduce k^ (since C
0
() > 0). As
Ek=w < 0, this can only be obtained through an increase of w:  needs to be positive,
which means that one of the taxes has to be La¤er-ine¢ cient. Because k decreases, the
economy is moving closer to the social optimum even though it is moving away from the
golden rule.
(ii) The rise in w induces a loss of wage which negatively a¤ects both consumptions, but
it increases the interest rate and then the crucial parameter is the relative sensitivity of
consumptions to the interest rate. As proposition 2 stated, the double dividend can only
be achieved, in this case of under-accumulation, if yc > 0 and oc < 0. We have previously
shown (eq.(19)), that, for  > 0, this can be veried only if Ecy=r > Eco=r, that is if
 < 1.
As an evident consequence, we can emphasize the cases where under-accumulation and
double dividend are incompatible : when the balanced environmental reform requires an
decrease of the labor tax rate ( < 0), that is if both taxes are La¤er-e¢ cient, or when it
requires an increase of the labor tax rate if  > 1, because in this last case, the elasticity
of the young consumption to the interest rate is nil or negative (for example, if the utility
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function is Cobb-Douglas or logarithmic).
Proposition 4 If k^ < k^ or k^ > k^g, the environmental scal policy gives rise to a conict
between the environmental dividend and the optimality issue.
Proof. The reduction of pollution needs, in any case, a decrease of aggregate consumption
which is not desirable from the optimality point of view, when k^ < k^ or k^ > k^g. Indeed,
if k^ > k^g (resp. k^ < k^), there is over-accumulation (resp. under-accumulation) and
any decrease of aggregate consumption needs an increase (resp. a decrease) of per capita
capital stock which moves farther away from the social optimum.
There are here, in fact, two di¤erent cases. In the case of under-accumulation under
the modied golden rule, the reduction of the pollution can not be socially justied and
the pursuit of the rst dividend leads to a decrease of pollution and of per capita capital
stock under their optimal levels ((k^) and k^). But in the case of over-accumulation,
the competitive level of pollution may be either too great or too low compared with its
optimal level (see Figure 1). When it is already too low, the same results apply. But when
the initial pollution stock is too great, the environmental scal reform will move it closer
to its optimal level while getting the capital stock farther from the social optimum. In this
last case, the environmental scal reform would be legitimate from the ecological point of
view, but not from the economic one.
Let us summarize the results obtained in our propositions. A long term double dividend
can only be obtained for an economy characterized by a capital stock less than the golden
rule capital stock level (k^g) and greater then the modied golden rule one (k^) (Propo-
sition 3); any other initial equilibrium gives rise to a conict between the environment
and economic welfare because the improvement of economic welfare would compulsorily
increase total per capita consumption (Proposition 4) and then pollution (see Figure 1).
The consequence of this result is rather intuitive: the lower the social discount factor (),
the easier it is for the necessary condition to be veried. Indeed, when the present gen-
erations are very impatient,  is low and k^ is low, and the initial equilibrium per capita
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capital stock is more likely to be in between the modied golden rule and the golden rule.
In this case, as the initial equilibrium is above the modied golden rule, the per capita
capital stock has to decrease, which can occur only in the case of a decrease in savings.
The usual way to obtain this result in an overlapping generations model is to introduce a
lump-sum tax bearing on the workers. In our case of exogenous labor supply, the labor tax
can be considered as a lump-sum tax. w must increase (Proposition 3). Our Proposition
1 showed that such a La¤er-ine¢ ciency case can occur.
6 Has a generation to be sacriced?
In this section, we measure the welfare variation of the young and old generations in order
to address the issue of the inter-generations distributional e¤ects of the scal reform.
We are searching here to know if there is any possibility for the environmental reform
not to imply any welfare loss for the generations bearing it. In our static framework, we
consider a small departure from the initial steady-state. Let us dene the compensatory
income variation of the young generation dRy and of the old generation dRo as:
8>>>><>>>>:
dRy = po


@x=@
@v=@co
d +

acy    

d e
dRo = po
@z=@
@v=@co
d +

co
1
1 + r

a  po	
+


d e
This short-term analysis of welfare concerns the very period of the scal reform: we
examine the distributional e¤ects between younger and older generations coexisting at a
given date, and not during their life-cycle. These distributional e¤ects depend only on
the non-environmental consequences of the reform because the environmental ones are the
same for both generations. We assume in this section that the rst dividend is ensured
(d < 0).
Let us examine the di¤erent cases in accordance with the sign of the variation of the
labor tax rate.
In the case of an increase of the labor tax rate, the young generation su¤ers unambigu-
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ously a non environmental welfare loss: rstly, the increase of the pollution tax increases
the consumption price, and secondly the labor tax rate increase causes revenue losses.
As far as the old generation is concerned, it can benet from an increase of its non-
environmental welfare if the discounted second-period price of consumption decreases, i.e.
if a < po	 (cf. section 4.2). In this peculiar case, this generation enjoys a privatedou-
ble dividend because we assume that it benets from the improvement of the environmental
conditions (the rst dividend is obtained). More generally, if the rst dividend is greater
than the non-environmental welfare loss, both generations may enjoy a global welfare gain.
When the labor tax rate decreases, both generations can either benet or su¤er from
the reform. As far as the young generation is concerned, the negative price e¤ect induced
by the rise in the pollution tax rate may be compensated for by a positive revenue e¤ect
allowed by the drop of the labor tax rate. The nal welfare e¤ect is positive if its initial
consumption is not too large (cy < a ). The old generation su¤ers unambiguously
an economic welfare loss because it does not benet from the wage positive e¤ect but it
experiences the decline of the interest on its savings and the increased price of consumption.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we have shown that a balanced environmental scal reform may result
either in an increase or a decrease of the labor tax rate, depending on the elasticities
of consumption and on the initial tax rates. In both cases, the existence conditions of
a double dividend rely on the initial per capita capital stock and on the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution. Our rst conclusion is that, whatever the initial capital intensity
of the economy, the double dividend cannot be obtained if the intertemporal elasticity of
substitution is equal or greater than unity. Furthermore, if this elasticity is less than unity,
the existence of the long term double dividend depends on the position of the economy
relative to the golden rule and to the modied golden rule.
In the case of over-accumulation, the double dividend can not occur. Indeed the
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consumption of the young generation should increase while that of the old one should
decrease and both taxes should be La¤er-e¢ cient. In this last case, the environmental
scal reform may be justied from an ecological point of view, when the initial pollution
level is greater than the optimal one, but not from an economic point of view as the pursuit
of a double dividend moves the economy farther from the social optimum.
In the case of under-accumulation, the existence of a long term double dividend needs
a reduction of the consumption of the old generation and an increase of that of the young
one and it can occur only if one of the taxes is La¤er-ine¢ cient and if the initial capital
stock is greater than the one dened by the modied golden rule.
The analysis of the distributional e¤ects between younger and older generations co-
existing at a given date shows that the environmental scal reform always induces a
non-environmental welfare loss for one of the existing generations: the young one when
the reform bears ex post on wages, the old one when it bears on capital. For nobody to
be harmed, the rst dividend needs to be su¢ ciently high.
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